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Abstract 
Disruptive innovation offers significant promise regarding expedited global low-carbon 
transition, set against currently inadequate efforts.  In order to appreciate its significance, 
however, disruptive low-carbon innovation must be analysed in the light of three key shifts in 
perspective: to an analysis of system transition and low-carbon innovation itself in terms of 
power/knowledge; to appraisal of the significance of digital innovation (similarly 
reconceptualised) and its embryonic convergence with disruptive innovation; and to a 
geographical focus on innovation happening not (just) in locations usually presumed as 
leading in hi-tech, but to developing countries and especially China.  Indeed, exploring 
disruptive innovation in this way shows that assenting to the commonplace discourse through 
which Silicon Valley Tech innovation is identified as 'disruptive' is to conflate problem with 
solution.   Conversely, this approach shows just how significant disruptive innovation is 
likely to prove to low-carbon transition, effecting a disruption of innovation itself, and thence 
of capitalism, from which any such transition must ultimately emerge. 
 
  
1 Disruptive Low-Carbon Innovation revisited 
 
Wholesale low-carbon transition is urgently needed to stay within 1.5oC limits, but remains 
elusive (Parson 2017).  Could disruptive low-carbon innovation (DLCI) help regarding this 
imperative? 
 
The idea of DLCI was first raised 10 years ago (Willis et al. 2007), and subsequently taken 
up with special focus on developing countries (Kaplinsky 2011), especially China (Tyfield et 
al. 2010, Tyfield & Jin 2010). What is DLCI and why is it important?  Against the stream of 
current discussion (Wilson 2017), our starting point here is the seminal work of Christensen 
(1997).  While addressing a business strategy readership and not specifically concerned with 
low-carbon transition, Christensen’s work nonetheless furnishes a broad but rigorous 
definition of ‘disruptive innovation’ (DI).  This concerns “cheaper, easier-to-use alternatives 
to existing products or services often produced by non-traditional players that target 
previously ignored customers” (Willis et al. 2007) and/or their use in novel contexts and 
combinations.  This contrasts disruptive innovation with ‘sustaining innovation’ along 
existing, stabilized techno-economic trajectories.  The former thus effects a social 
redefinition of existing technologies through recombination, thereby offering possibly lower 
functionality against existing metrics initially.  Over time, though, such innovation may 
‘disrupt’ at varying levels, as new low-cost offerings attract not only users previously unable 
to afford these technological affordances, but also increasingly the incumbent ‘mainstream’ 
market.   
 
The particular promise of low-carbon DI rests in precisely these characteristics: low-cost, 
rapid (driven by its own spontaneous demand) global deployment of existing technologies in 
novel combinations (and incremental improvements thereof) can be favourably compared 
with the default (and stalling) model of low-carbon transition. The latter focuses on supply or 
production of high-cost new-to-the-world technologies from high-risk, slow and uncertain 
RDD&D processes.  Aligning with and corroborating criticisms of this dominant techno-
fetishistic narrative, a focus on such DLCI, and its social redefinition of (probably existing) 
technologies, also directly opens up the importance of socio-technological and systems issues 
(Elzen et al. 2004).   
 
These arguments are still pertinent today, and I welcome that DLCI is getting a new and 
arguably more high-profile hearing, amplified through Future Earth and this SI.  But in this 
paper I also want to go beyond restatement of this original case to update and extend that 
argument in light of both more recent, clearer evidence of challenges and positive trends, and 
developments in theoretical understanding.  In brief, this involves three key steps, set out in 
much greater detail in Tyfield (2017):  
- Reframing understanding of low-carbon transition and innovation, including DI, as 
not just a socio-technical system process but one of power/knowledge. 
- From this perspective, appraising the nature and importance of digital innovation to 
both low-carbon innovation and disruptive innovation (and their conjunction). 
- Illustrating and developing these arguments with the contemporary geographical 
exemplar of such disruptive (digital and/or low-carbon) innovation, namely China. 
 
Along the way I also not only reaffirm the Christensen point that there is a specific form of 
innovation that merits its own label – ‘disruptive innovation’ – and that conflating this with 
innovation per se is to evacuate the term of any useful rigorous analytical meaning.  But also, 
and stronger, I argue that the predominant contemporary manifestation of that conceptual 
laxity – in which Silicon Valley ‘Tech’ is widely imagined as the archetype of ‘disruptive 
innovation’ – is not merely obfuscating but actively complicit in reproducing the problem 
low-carbon transition is trying to tackle. In short, if we accept this commonplace 
(mis)interpretation, then ‘disruptive innovation’ is part of the problem, not the ‘solution’.   
 
Given that the public sphere is (rightly!) more powerful in determining the meanings of terms 
than academic argument (which may of course participate in the former), it is tempting to 
drop ‘disruptive’ innovation altogether and replace it with another term (e.g. ‘game-
changing’, or, in Chinese, ‘poju’ (see Tyfield et al. 2010)1).  But given that this special issue 
– and broader initiative – is aiming to illuminate the crucial role that DLCI could play in the 
greatest challenge of our time – let alone that it was Christensen’s coining initially – it seems 
legitimate still to fight for the meaning of ‘disruptive innovation’, as I do here.  
 
2  Complex power/knowledge systems, their government and their transition 
 
Our first contention is that to understand DLCI and its importance, and indeed low-carbon 
transition itself, we need to adopt a complex power/knowledge systems (CPKS) perspective.  
This conceptualizes the problem field of low-carbon transition, and innovation more 
generally, not just as multi-agent, multi-factorial (and hence socio-technical) and multi-
levelled (e.g. Geels 2002, hence ‘MLP’) systems, as is increasingly the orthodoxy in 
innovation studies.  They are also, and essentially, composed of complex, dynamic 
assemblages of relatively sedimented relations and technologies of power/knowledge 
(Tyfield et al. 2015, Foucault 2009, Flyvbjerg et al. 2012).  
 
I use the combined term ‘power/knowledge’ to indicate the specific conceptualisation of 
power drawn on in this perspective, inspired by the later work of Michel Foucault.  In brief, 
this presentation aims to shorthand how power and knowledge are different but inseparable 
aspects of the same (strategic, relational and practiced) phenomenon, not completely different 
issues.  Hence even academic knowledge must be primarily assessed in terms of what it does 
and enables (or disables) in the world and how, not just in terms of the representative truth of 
what it says; while conversely, even the heights of ‘power politics’ must be analysed in terms 
of how they manipulate and successfully dominate others, not least through their deployment 
and development of particular knowledge claims and practices, as ‘power/knowledge 
technologies’.  For example, Google’s or Facebook’s proprietary algorithms and software are 
essential to their domination of their respective aspects of the digital political economy. 
International IP laws, technoeconomic paradigms, sociotechnical imaginaries of development 
or norms of high-status consumption are also all power/knowledge technologies. 
 
These complex assemblages (or dynamic ‘structures’) of power/knowledge relations and 
technologies are then co-produced, in interactive parallel, with strategic agency, including 
(everyday) practices and even the very subjectivities of agents themselves (Figure 1).   The 
systems are thus not just transformed or ‘transitioned’, but constituted and conducted through 
the constant cycling of this co-production of ‘structure’ and ‘agency’, where both are 
conceptualized as constitutively relational, dynamic and strategic.   
 
As such, it is not that ‘power’ enters the picture only to ‘change’ a system already there and 
conceptualized as stable, nor that it is just a nefarious force responsible for lock-in to 
dysfunctional systems.  Rather, the prior stabilization and emergence of that system in the 
first place is itself a matter of never-ending, ongoing, dynamic strategic jockeying. Moreover, 
in this perspective innovation emerges as a key process of this perpetual reconstitution and 
governing of these systems, as itself a power/knowledge process that we may call innovation-
as-politics.    
 
Figure 1  
Complex Socio-technical Power/Knowledge Systems 
  
        
 
 
The red box denotes the system as a whole. 
The two black boxes denote the constant relational co-production of ‘structure’ and ‘agency’ (black 
arrows), with the former including the co-production, in turn, of power/knowledge relations and 
technologies. 
The blue box denotes R&I as a subset of ‘agency’ that directly acts on and transforms socio-technical 
power/knowledge technologies (blue arrow). 
In the case of system transition, cycles of positive feedback can generate increasing power momentum 
over time. 
 
This is not the place to argue the advantages of this change in perspective in detail (Tyfield 
2014, Tyfield et al. 2015, Tyfield & Zuev forthcoming, Tyfield 2017).  In brief, though, 
reframed as systems of power/knowledge, analytical purchase is afforded on persistently 
problematic issues for MLP (and cognate) perspectives (Smith et al. 2010).  For instance, 
how can analysis illuminate system transition and potential trajectories for upscaling of 
existing ‘niches’ to the level of ‘regime’ discontinuity, and not just post hoc but prospectively 
and in real-time?  Of course, this approach also places issues of power, politics and culture – 
likewise issues repeatedly noted as crucial gaps in the MLP (e.g. Avelino & Rotmans 2009, 
Kern 2011, Kern et al. 2014, Shove and Walker 2009, Geels & Verhees 2011) – at the very 
heart of theoretical understanding, not seeking to patch them in at a later stage.  
 
More importantly for our purposes, this shift in perspective underpins each of the sets of 
insights that follow here.  We start with the crucial one of reappraising what exactly (the 
challenge of) low-carbon transition is, and likewise for its corollary, low-carbon innovation. 
Conceptualized this way, it becomes clear that the challenge of low-carbon transition consists 
of transforming the power/knowledge relational ‘structure’, and the strategic agency/ies 
mediating and mediated by it, such that both are increasingly ‘sustainability-oriented’ (Cf 
Altenburg & Pegels 2012).  Likewise, low-carbon innovation is primarily a power/knowledge 
process through which diverse power/knowledge technologies of system government are 
progressively made ecologically-attentive.  In short, system transition is a process by and 
through which innovation-as-politics transforms not just the socio-technical furniture but the 
dynamic and mutually mediating phenomena – power/knowledge relations and technologies 
alongside subjectivities, identities and communities – that constitute given ‘societies’, 
including the dominant model of innovation itself.   
 
Low-carbon innovation is thus primarily challenged with conjuring, cajoling and amassing 
the ‘power momentum’ (Tyfield et al. 2015) through which a new dynamic regime of 
(power/knowledge) system government may finally emerge: transition is a power/knowledge 
transition. And it is thus by exploring empirical evidence of specific low-carbon innovations 
displaying embryonic emergence of such power momentum, which may then be qualitatively 
but uncertainly extrapolated into ‘plausible’ (Wilkinson et al. 2013) scenarios, that this 
approach affords insightful strategic foresight of real-time transitions (see Tyfield 2017). 
 
These abstract insights thus profoundly reframe transition studies in productive ways. But 
they are also illuminating regarding an analysis of the substantive characteristics of the 
contemporary predicament facing low-carbon transition in at least two key respects, 
regarding the abstract challenge (or ‘where we need to get to’) and the concrete predicament 
(or ‘from where’).   
 
Regarding the former, low-carbon innovation is still too readily discussed in terms that 
presume the one-for-one and one-off replacement of existing ‘high-carbon’ technologies with 
better ‘green’ ones.  It is clear, though, that low-carbon transition will not be (and cannot be) 
such a superficial technological substitution, leaving the substance of contemporary high-
carbon ways of life as they are.  Rather it must be an iterative and medium/long-term process 
of profound socio-technical change.  Moreover, this process must itself prominently feature – 
and will be most effective and expeditious to the extent it consists of – profitable, competitive 
innovations, capable of both rapid adoption and cumulative growth of (power) momentum; 
all considerations strongly favouring DLCI, as already noted.   
 
But a CPKS perspective illuminates this problematic further, allowing us to see that low-
carbon transition is not a single ‘problem’ at all, not even a ‘system’ one. Rather it is merely 
one lens on a whole set of existential contemporary challenges – including for innovation 
itself – that simply cannot be analytically separated, let alone meaningfully addressed, in 
isolation, notwithstanding the ubiquitous attempts to do so.   
 
For alongside climate change, there are not only the whole wider set of planetary boundaries 
(Rockström et al. 2009, Steffen et al. 2015) and the socio-environmental challenges of the 
Anthropocene (e.g. Bonneuil & Fressoz 2016).  But these are interwoven also with the 
emergence of cosmopolitized globalism (e.g. Beck 2016, Duara 2014) and of new horizons of 
post- or trans-human innovation from massive networks of cheap interconnected learning 
machines (e.g. Harari 2017, Mason 2015).  As such, ‘low-carbon transition’ is simply the 
name for a much wider challenge for contemporary innovation-as-politics insofar as it is seen 
specifically through environmental glasses (and of anthropogenic climate change).  
 
This wider challenge concerns a new global predicament of learning how to do the ‘complex 
government of complex systems’ well (Tyfield 2017). For each of these sub-challenges are 
different (and overlapping) manifestations of the inadequacy of current systems for the 
government of proliferating global complexity and inter-dependence. Such adept government 
of complexity, however, is mediated precisely by the prevailing relations and technologies of 
power/knowledge systems, demanding their iterative, incremental transformation and 
upgrading in real-time.  And this reflexive transformation of power/knowledge relations is 
exactly what is meant by ‘innovation’(-as-politics).  Contemporary innovation, including 
low-carbon, is thus primarily charged with transforming the processes and capacities for 
system governance that are capable of harnessing, rather than being overwhelmed by, 
proliferating complexity, ultimately towards the emergence of qualitatively new and 
productive dynamics at (global) system level.  
 
As such, on the one hand, we can now specify that the goal of low-carbon transition is the 
emergence of such productive dynamics at system level for the ongoing and unending 
improvement and maintenance of resilient government of complexity, NOT a new and 
restabilized “post-transition” green socio-technical system. But, on the other, this also means 
that we must accept and embrace that there is no ‘there’ to which low-carbon transition is 
seeking to move, no specifiable or imaginable future (utopian?) end-state – and that 
(acknowledging) this irreducible future uncertainty is an essential element of constructing 
better futures, not an unfortunate or defeatist concession to reduced rational mastery. We thus 
need new dominant models of innovation that, like DI, are likewise adept at surfing rising 
waves of complexity and uncertainty – as crucial tools and resources of just such complex 
system government.  
 
But this perspective also usefully illuminates the converse: the concrete, actual (meso-level) 
‘here’ of these, overlapping system failures and crises, the aspiration of escape from which is 
given the name ‘low-carbon transition’.  This concerns the overarching crisis of the specific 
regime that is currently dominant at global scale, at the heart of which – being a 
power/knowledge system – is its particular model of power/knowledge government: the 
hegemonic model of neoliberal innovation(-as-politics). Neoliberalism is a regime of system 
government that has dominated global capitalism for some four decades.  It is fundamentally 
oriented to expansion without limit of the rule of the market, which is conceptualized as the 
supreme decision-maker (Mirowski 2011).  At its heart, in turn, is a specific model of 
innovation, focusing on highly proprietary, consumer and labour-substituting hi-tech with a 
view to maximized concentrated corporate control of all spheres of socio-economic life 
(Birch et al. 2016, Lazonick et al. 2017, Pagano & Rossi 2017, Tyfield et al. 2017).   
 
In recent years, as the ‘digital revolution’ has taken hold, this has mutated into a ‘late’ phase, 
in which internet giants have claimed the dominant models of innovation and corporate 
power (Schiller & Yeo 2017).  This mutation of neoliberalism poses as its antithesis, 
emphasising its ‘open’ innovation credentials and free access to its services while carefully 
concealing the ways in which it depends upon a radical intensification of key neoliberal 
elements (Morozov 2013, Lanier 2013, Taplin 2017, Lanchester 2017), in a ‘Googliberalism’ 
(Tyfield 2013).   
 
In particular, these platforms enact a model of innovation that depends, more so even than 
archetypal neoliberal biotech, on growing speculative investment in its financialized assets 
(Birch 2017), betting on the exponential growth of super-proprietary rents from monopoly 
control of markets for the exploitation of existing resources.  Googliberal innovation is thus 
essentially parasitic and un-creative, intrinsically built upon the zero-sum Ponzi-like 
exploitation of current assets and resources, including the incumbent oil-based socio-
technical system.  It also thus divides societies ever more clearly into few spectacular winners 
– the asset-owning rentier, global, tax-dodging and increasingly politically-enabled elite – 
and a growing majority of system losers – a debt-laden, wage-stagnant, insecure and 
increasingly system-rejecting precariat – in mutual co-production to the former’s deepening 
personal advantage.  Completing the cycle, then, winners pursue innovation that will further 
secure their advantage, not least through more Googliberal innovation, substituting 
productive, living-waged labour with cheap information technology.  Googliberalism thus 
fundamentally underpins power/knowledge lock-in against system transition. 
 
This characterization is necessarily far too brief. But it is sufficient to suggest how this 
dominant model of innovation-as-politics is a key dynamic in the power/knowledge 
government of the incumbent system, including its multiple overlapping and existentially-
threatening crises (Tyfield 2017: Chs. 2&3).  Yet it follows immediately that such innovation 
is not merely a different issue, comparatively irrelevant, to low-carbon transition – though it 
is hard to miss the terrible waste of ingenuity and finance currently invested in creating the 
next Killer App for some existing (if not environmentally problematic) consumption practice, 
rather than in tackling our planetary emergency.  Rather, such innovation is in fact a key 
pillar of the problem.  For it both actively discourages and obstructs significant low-carbon 
innovation while itself continually re-constructing and reproducing the high-carbon 
power/knowledge system and its extreme and worsening power asymmetries that we need to 
transcend.  Furthermore, it follows that to the extent that we assent to the self-satisfied 
appropriation of the high-cachet label of ‘disruptive innovation’ (“the new rock and roll”, as 
the T-shirt declaims) by Silicon Valley Big Tech, we are also confusing the problem for the 
solution. 
 
In short, then, a complex power/knowledge systems perspective alerts us to the siren song of 
Silicon Valley ‘disruptive innovation’, and spells out much more clearly even than socio-
technical systems literature the nature and scale of the challenge for low-carbon innovation.  
To be of any relevance to low-carbon transition, in other words, what “disruptive innovation” 
has to disrupt is innovation(-as-politics) itself.  
 
3 The convergence of digital and disruptive innovation towards complexity capitalism 
 
None of the foregoing should be mistaken, though, for arguing that digital innovation is 
irrelevant to disruptive low-carbon innovation, even as the issues are orthogonal and 
analytically distinguishable.  To the contrary – and a development that is now categorically 
clearer than when discussions of DLCI began roughly a decade ago – digital innovation is 
key to the prospects of disruptive low-carbon innovation making a significant impact, in at 
least two ways.  These go beyond reversing how digital innovation in its current dominant 
form is a key element of the problem, as just described.  Rather, they concern the potentially 
seismic productive impacts as digital innovation comes to converge, first, with low-carbon 
transition per se; and then with disruptive low-carbon innovation specifically.    
 
It must first be noted, though, that the advent of digital innovation is – per se not just in 
Googliberal form – a key element of the challenge, in terms of constructing complex 
government of complex systems.  For, itself conceived as a power/knowledge process, digital 
innovation sits at a key node in the cycles of the contemporary capitalist system and its 
(currently overflowing, uncontrolled) proliferation of complexity (see Figure 2, especially 
2c).  Digitization, and/or its flipside of informationalization, fundamentally consists of 
introducing a novel (i.e. ICT-based) mediation to processes of power/knowledge. For 
instance, manufacturing becomes mediated by software that, in turn, collects constant real-
time data for further optimization; so too for information search, listening to music, ride-
hailed journeys, even friendship.  This novel mediation affords the reflexive and recursive 
measurement, transformation, interconnection and expansion of these power/knowledge 
processes at hitherto unprecedented rates and scales, while these digital innovations also 
thereby constantly and reflexively upgrade themselves – the very acme of the positive 
feedback loops constitutive of complex systems.  In short, digital innovation is singularly 
productive of the problem-field of complex system government, even as it is generally 
evangelized as its panacea.   
 
But there is no going back, no putting the digital genie back in the bottle or closing Pandora’s 
Box. The only way forward, thus, is to develop new models of digital innovation that can 
work with its capacity for proliferation of complexity but to more system-productive 
outcomes. In this respect alone, we can immediately see how a different (non-Googliberal) 
digital innovation necessarily must form a key element of any low-carbon transition.  But 
conceived as a power/knowledge process, digital innovation also emerges as a clear, if as yet 
underexplored and seemingly tangential, aspect of low-carbon innovation itself.   
 
This hinges precisely on how the digital is the would-be meta-mediator of all 
power/knowledge processes.  For it follows not only that socio-environmental relations, 
technologies and practices (likewise conceptualized in power/knowledge terms) can be thus 
mediated, and thereby progressively transformed.  But also that viewing any and every 
ecological problem-field in this way also immediately makes it (much more, if never 
perfectly or ‘correctly’, and indeed, likely problematically) amenable to capitalist ingenuity: 
pragmatically but avariciously exploring ways in which collation, mastery, ownership and 
possible construction of the relevant socio-environmental data – the ‘new oil’ (Economist 
2017a) – can be of service to paying customers (and/or hopefully publics and state 
institutions) and hence profitable.2 
 
In this way, then, the field of low-carbon innovation can be transformed from that of 
committed green pioneers worthily and laboriously constructing low(er)-carbon technologies, 
to a more generalized ‘greenrush’… with all that implies, both positive and negative. In other 
words, digital intermediation enables a process that harnesses the exceptional productivity 
(for good and/or ill – see conclusion) of capitalist innovation into a growing power 
momentum of low-carbon transition, and from here, in this late-neoliberal, unequivocally 
capitalist present.  
 
Here the qualitatively tighter feedback loop of digital innovation (see Figure 2c Cf 2b), as 
power/knowledge technologies reflexively upgrading themselves, also flips from problem to 
opportunity.  While this dynamic is currently causing proliferating, untamed and destructive 
complexity, a digital greenrush would instead harness it into acceleration of productive 
innovation; and, indeed, a growing power momentum of sufficient heft that it can even break 
out of the profound current socio-technical system ‘carbon lock-in’ (Unruh 2000) (see Figure 
2d).  
 
But what has any of this to do with disruptive low-carbon innovation? The answer is, 
everything, in that this (system-) productive, low-carbon, complexity-adept capitalism, this 
new harnessing of digital innovation to such productive effect, is entirely dependent upon the 
latter’s convergence with disruptive innovation.  Regarding the productivity and results of 
innovation, the convergence of disruptive and digital innovation – now just beginning, as 
both ‘disruptive digital innovation’ and ‘digitized disruptive innovation’ – promises to effect 
an exponential boost in the significance of both, including for low-carbon transition.   
 
On the one hand, digital innovation adds a quantum boost to disruptive innovation. DLCI is 
already per se enabled – by its targeting of massive ready demand for low-cost but novel 
functionalities – to provide fast-growing goods and services disruptive of existing modes of 
practice. But combining this with digital innovation compounds this dynamism.  This is not 
just because it furnishes disruptive innovation with a whole new momentum, drawing on both 
the digitized opening up of innovation (if not quite or necessarily its ‘democratisation’) and 
the dynamic of ‘exponential technology’ described (and mistakenly conflated as ‘disruptive 
innovation’) by Silicon Valley futurist gurus (Myronuk 2017) – though these factors 
undoubtedly matter, and show how (a future) Silicon Valley could yet be a significant part of 
the transition, not just the problem.  But also because, where environmental innovation is 
increasingly mediated by digitization and datafication, these processes and projects of 
innovation are opened up to productive capitalist exploration and exploitation, as described 
above, thoroughly transforming the prospects and momentum of such innovation.  Low-
carbon innovation, in short, is productively reframed as primarily a challenge not of 
emissions and energy but of data and complexity and its harnessing for productive system 
government.  This thereby transforms low-carbon transition from expensive problem 
dependent on ethical vision and political will to a strategic opportunity for business. 
 
Moreover, in classic complex system positive feedback loops, this does not just apply to 
individual low-carbon ventures, but promises to transform the broader taskscape and 
possibility space of low-carbon innovation per se.  For both the greater hubbub of innovation 
activity generated by the combination of digital and disruptive (low-carbon) innovation, 
across a wide range of issues, and the nature of the disruptive innovation model itself – adept 
precisely at working rapidly, flexibly and resiliently with and within complex, uncertain and 
shifting milieux – combine to create a situation in which combinations of disruptive 
innovations (or recombinations of recombinations) are not just likely, but actively and 
relentlessly sought out.   
 
In this context, then, it is also likely that the investment climate and innovation zeitgeist 
would change.  Finance would no longer focus on unicorns, pursuing the ‘next Uber’ (of 
cooked meals, DIY tools or whatever…) that promises sure-fire returns for maximally 
monopolized exploitation of existing assets.  Instead, the game would become one of risky 
competitive investing in the disruptive innovation that best promises to be a pivotal (but 
maybe not ‘central’) node in an as-yet-nonexistent and irreducibly uncertain but credible 
future networked assemblage of firms and customers – where disruption of existing systems 
of provision in some form is the base common-sense.  
 
Interlocking with other still-to-be-developed innovations, then, these disruptive digital 
innovations will altogether mediate, and so govern anew, crucial complex processes of global 
socio-environmental metabolism. And with disruptive low-carbon innovation now ‘speaking 
the same language’ (i.e. of data and its ICT intermediation) as digital innovation, there is a 
new bridge and lubricant for cross-fertilization.  In this way, too, innovation can be imagined 
(if, of course, not guaranteed) that is progressively more capable of dealing with socio-
environmental challenges in all their geographical specificity, complication and complexity, 
not just proffering an (entirely unrealistic and strategically self-defeating) one-size-fits-all 
‘green technology’ future.  And this is especially the case since this is disruptive innovation-
as-politics, meaning that these disruptive digital low-carbon innovations will very likely be 
profoundly contested and thereby made into effective power/knowledge technologies of 
system government (e.g. see Table 1, below). 
 
In short, then, digital disruptive innovation allows at least the conceptualization of a 
transformed capitalism, in the medium-term, in which crystallizing clusters of actual system 
transition are increasingly observable and so themselves become the focus of competitive 
innovation and investment.  In other words, if DI (and DLCI) to date has already shown 
promise working on ‘real world’ socio-technologies, as it comes to be combined with and 
mediated through digitization it could well become revolutionary – or, rather, 
‘transformational’ (Cf Smith et al. 2005).  
 
On the other hand, disruptive innovation reciprocally transforms digital innovation.  In 
particular, disruptive innovation offers a model of low-cost, hence capital-substituting, and 
labour-creating innovation capable of harnessing digital innovation to productive ends 
(regarding new commodities/services, sectors and even systems), not merely parasitic, 
exploitative and labour-destroying ones. Consider, for instance, disruptive innovation 
regarding low-cost heart surgery in India (Economist 2010) or solar water heaters in China 
(Yu 2017, Urban et al. 2015).  A DI model thus enables digital innovation to reap parallel 
transformation of the ‘structure’ of power/knowledge relations such that it can begin to 
match, keep up with and newly regulate the transformations it is already driving in agency, 
practices and power/knowledge technologies (Figure 2d).   
 
As such, disruptive (and disrupted, post-Googliberal) digital innovation(as-politics) can 
indeed become the key element of low-carbon transition mentioned above; constantly, 
dynamically and cumulatively transforming both power/knowledge relations and 
technologies towards marshalling the necessary power momentum for a new complexity-
adept capitalism (in the first instance) that can avert climate catastrophe in the next few 
decades.  
 
Figure 2: Historical Evolution of Complex Socio-technical Power/Knowledge Systems 
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upgraded institutions & ‘structures’ for the governance of complexity. 
 
 4 Changing the game from top to bottom - the Chinese disrupters 
 
The final step I chart here, though, concerns the all-important question of existing empirical 
evidence for this abstractly characterizable dynamic. Or, to put it slightly differently, where is 
this happening?  The answer redirects our attention one final time, and again away from the 
faux ‘disruptive’ innovation of Silicon Valley, to the constantly orthodoxy-defying case of 
the rising centre of global capitalism, China.  Again, it is a complex power/knowledge 
systems perspective that is crucial for this insight in terms of offering a deeper understanding 
of the dynamics and capacities, and so prospects and (global, historical) significance, of 
Chinese innovation; and, in particular, of the mutual illumination of DI and Chinese 
innovation (Tyfield 2017).  
 
China’s strength, and arguably global leadership, in DI has long been noted (Zeng & 
Williamson 2007, Breznitz & Murphree 2011) and is increasingly focused on as the very key 
to China’s historically unprecedented economic growth over the past 30 years and its 
continuing dynamism today (Tse 2016, Rein 2016, Yip & McKern 2016, Atherton & 
Newman 2017).  Moreover, this not only increasingly includes, as now archetypical 
examples, China’s digital giants (e.g. Baidu, Alibaba and Tencent) – as genuinely ‘disruptive’ 
in ways that Silicon Valley are not – which also happen to be the most famous of China’s 
comparatively few global brands, notwithstanding the barriers of the ‘Great Firewall’.  But it 
also includes disruptive low-carbon innovations. These are both high-profile, as arguably in 
fields of wind and solar PV innovation, where Chinese companies now consistently rank 
amongst the biggest firms in the world; and, no less importantly, lower-profile but massively 
adopted innovations (Tyfield et al. 2010), such as solar thermal (Urban et al. 2015) and 
electric two-wheelers (Cherry et al. 2016).    
 
From the perspective of low-carbon transition itself, too, this Chinese disruptive low-carbon 
innovation is prima facie of great significance.  China is now the world’s largest emitter of 
GHGs in absolute terms (more than the US and EU combined) and with fast growing per 
capita emissions too (already greater than the EU).  So low-carbon transition in China is 
clearly an urgent global priority; indeed, a sine qua non.  Yet China, for all its spectacular 
development and burgeoning hypermodern megacities, remains a country with significant 
challenges of poverty and socio-economic development still ahead.   
 
In these circumstances, then, the low-cost and ready-technology focus of DLCI appears 
particularly appropriate and promising for the rapid mass adoption needed to effect low-
carbon transition now, and not in a generation or two’s time when it will be too late.  
Moreover, China sits at a crucial juncture in the global predicament of low-carbon transition.  
For it must develop low-carbon innovations that address both the problems of the rich, 
developed, urban and poor, developing, rural worlds.  Its propagation of low-carbon 
innovations that ‘work’ in this unique context, thus, is well-placed to be of global impact – as 
is necessary for low-carbon transition – and with disruptive low-carbon innovations likely to 
feature heavily. 
 
The significance of disruptive innovation, digital disruptive innovation and China for each 
other and for low-carbon transition, however, is particularly illuminated when studying this 
field from a CPKS perspective.  For this furnishes an analysis that argues against both the 
usual presumption that disruptive (low-carbon) innovation is an interesting but peripheral 
issue – so that DLCI must be raised rather apologetically, like a pet project –, and its cognate 
misunderstanding that Chinese innovation capacity remains profoundly weak (especially in 
comparison with the heights of the presumed benchmark of Silicon Valley).  This concerns 
several key points.  
 
First, contemporary Chinese innovation capacity is essentially contested (e.g. Lewin et al. 
2016). Profoundly negative assessments, based on its weak record of global-leading hi-tech 
companies and political analyses of the profound structural impediments to their incubation, 
are set against positive assessments, which provide a litany of impressive statistics (of 
national R&D expenditure, patent filings, scientific publications and citations etc…).  But a 
CPKS perspective can accommodate the half-truths of both positions to illuminate the 
inauspicious but nonetheless extraordinary productivity of contemporary Chinese innovation.   
 
This concerns the characterisation of Chinese processes of innovation, and innovation 
upgrade, as ‘non-linear’ (Kierkegaard 2016) and, surging from balloon to bust (ten Brink & 
Butollo 2016), but ending up with the construction nonetheless of new industries and sectors.  
Chinese disruptive innovation is central to this process, being especially well suited to 
working with and within not only the broader conditions of overflowing complexity of (late) 
neoliberal globalization, but also to the particular turbulence and uncertain business climate 
of China (Tse 2016).  It is thus disruptive innovations specifically, focusing on strategies of 
maximal ‘tempo, volume and cost’ for customers  (Nahm & Steinfeld 2014), that have ended 
up prospering in China as they flexibly, responsively incubate new firms, industries – and 
thence sectors and socio-technical systems.  The key strategy here is to target good-enough, 
low-cost disruptive innovation that is particularly attractive to the under-institutionalized, 
massive but cash-constrained domestic market (Breznitz & Murphree 2011, Brandt & Thun 
2010).  
 
This dynamic is not just a techno-economic one of familiar Schumpeterian creative 
destruction and dynamic capitalist disequilibrium.  Chinese disruptive innovation may be 
understood this way, but what this analysis misses is the broader process, beyond the firm 
level to the ‘national innovation system’ as a whole, through which China’s ostensible 
weaknesses – when assessed against contemporary orthodoxy – serve to incubate its 
particular strengths, while, vice versa, seeming strengths are actually medium-term 
processual weaknesses and liabilities.   
 
This analysis, however, is only possible when the ‘innovation system’ is explored in terms of 
a complex and dynamic system of power/knowledge relations. For this opens up the 
possibility of exploring not only the direct effects of innovation policy and regulation, in 
terms of the techno-economic ‘outputs’ of innovation (e.g. technologies, capacities, firms, 
clusters etc…), both intended and positive, and inadvertent and negative.  But also the 
indirect effects of China’s contradictory innovation system in terms of the constitution of new 
political economic agencies and subjectivities.  Again, these may be both welcome and 
possibly unwelcome vis-à-vis the incumbent party-state regime. But, regardless, the 
constitution of such new agencies and power nuclei is crucial for any prospect of low-carbon 
(power) transition (see Table 1).  It is thus not just that the dynamic of Chinese innovation is 
observably ‘non-linear’ regarding the development of new firms and technologies, but also 
that it is non-linear regarding the broader, national (if geographically clustered) incubation of 
(novel forms of) empowered capacity for and through innovation-as-politics.   
 
  
Table 1 [about here] 
The Quadrant of Chinese Disruptive Innovation-as-Politics – the Case of Urban e-
Mobility 
 




‘China Optimist’ analyses: 
Increasing globally significant 
state investment and support 
for innovation at unrivalled 
scale and pace 
 
e.g. Electric car ‘overtaking 
around the corner’; World No.1 
in EV sales (by 2015) 
‘China Disruptor’ analyses: 
Constraints and opportunities 
feed private/ hybrid-overseas 
disruptive innovators creating 
resilient, highly dynamic  and 
competitive firms of increasing 
systemic importance and 
innovation capacity 
 
e.g. Electric 2-wheelers 
/micro-EV as specifically 
Chinese disruptive innovation 
BUT neglected and proscribed 




‘China Pessimist’ analyses: 
Misallocation and hamstrung 
central planning, plus 
unwarranted focus on hi-tech 
supply/push, generating 
deepening political economic 
imbalances, in China and 
globally 
 
e.g. Slow & relatively 
minuscule EV sales, 
dependent on expensive and 
gamed government subsidies 
(being phased out) and 
disinterest amongst state-
owned enterprise auto majors 




Increasing capacity bridging 
domestic and global demand, 
and responding to immanent 
demand to ‘move up the value 
chain’, not least into new 
emerging industry sectors; 
together with deepening 
systemic dysfunction, pushing 
beyond the incumbent CPKSs 
of both China and global 
capitalism 
 
e.g. Evolving Chinese digital 
Mobility-as-a-Service 
innovation-as-politics in co-
productive parallel with middle 
class emergence 
 
Source: adapted from Tyfield (2017) 
 
 
In other words, the specific strength of disruptive innovation in China becomes both 
explicable in terms of, and thereby in turn further illuminates, China’s unique constellation of 
power/knowledge relations.  This conditions its exceptional constraints and enablings, 
pressures and openings, for capitalist innovation and the relentless pursuit of continual 
upgrading, all within a national project widely understood as existential.  It is thus not just 
notwithstanding the constraints of the overbearing state and its multiple frustrations of 
entrepreneurship – undoubtedly characteristic of contemporary China (Fuller 2016) –, but in 
some key respects because of these, that China specifically has developed a growing culture 
of disruptive innovators; and, vice versa, that disruptive innovation has emerged as the 
singular strength of Chinese innovation.   
 
Yet the profound, ‘structural’ and landscape (in the MLP-sense) conditions underpinning 
these massively productive tensions remain very much in place.  This therefore augurs the 
continuation of the turbulent dynamism of China’s process of innovation upgrade through 
growing national pillars of disruptive innovators – and the increasingly apparent evidence of 
these firms and the socio-technical niches they are constructing – for the foreseeable future.  
And this is of the greatest significance regarding low-carbon transition, in several respects.   
 
First, because of the exceptional intensity of environmental challenges in China, these 
innovators – and their core source of demand, amongst the burgeoning urban ‘middle classes’ 
(that likely include these entrepreneurs themselves) – are attuned to environmental issues in 
ways that are simply not in evidence amongst other innovative cultures around the world, 
especially Silicon Valley.  Nor is this attention to the environment just in evidence amongst 
start-ups.  China’s digital disruptor giants are also notable for the explicit attention they are 
giving, in discourse and in practice, to environmental innovation (Tse 2016). And all of this 
has the significant and consequential backing of the highest levels of government, through 
slogans and policies of ‘ecological civilization’, the ‘new normal’, and ‘China 2020’ 
innovation upgrade.   
 
Nor is disruptive innovation in China limited to a digital rearranging of ownership of existing 
assets.  Rather, it has already shown itself capable of significant ‘real-world’ changes, as in 
the uniquely rapid uptake of cashless payments, and now with increasing evidence of 
dynamism even in some of the ‘hardest cases’ (Geels et al. 2013) of low-carbon transition, 
such as urban mobility (Tyfield & Zuev, forthcoming; see Table 1).  In the latter, the parallel 
and unrivalled growth of China’s capacity for heavy industry and infrastructure building, 
together with the state institutions and budgets for upscaling, both in China and increasingly 
(via the ‘new Silk Roads’ or ‘One Belt, One Road’ policies) overseas, are also likely to be 
significant boosts.  There is thus a significant and growing dynamism amongst what is 
already a singularly dynamic wave of Chinese disruptive innovators towards increasing 
concern with low-carbon innovation.   
 
But, secondly, and as intimated above, the growing momentum of these disruptive 
innovations and entrepreneurs in itself transforms the possibility and conceivability of system 
transition; and thereby, given that very momentum, renders it very likely indeed.  In short, 
then, from this CPKS perspective, we can see today that the embryonic evidence of the 
convergence of digital and disruptive innovation in a rising (capitalist) China does not just 
make DLCI an important string to the bow of global efforts on climate change, but arguably 
the most important vehicle and agent apparent to date of low-carbon transition. And, to 
repeat, where this involves transition from the incumbent model of innovation and dominant 
global regime of capitalism and its high-carbon socio-technical system, at the apex of which 
sits ‘disruptive’ Silicon Valley.   
 
5 Conclusion: A long strange trip still ahead 
 
This paper set out to make the case for the key importance of disruptive low-carbon 
innovation in the urgent challenge of global low-carbon transition, while thereby drawing a 
strict distinction with the model of innovation that has largely usurped the moniker of 
‘disruptive’ in recent years.   Exploring disruptive innovation and low-carbon transition from 
the perspective of complex power/knowledge systems and their rolling governance, 
reproduction and transformation, I have argued that genuinely disruptive innovation when 
combined with digital innovation promises fruition of extraordinary and as-yet unforeseeable 
beneficial developments in this regard; and that these are especially likely to emerge in, or 
least in collaboration with, Chinese enterprises.  But we can hardly end on such a positive 
(complacent) note, without first noting some key and challenging further implications of a 
CPKS reading of DLCI.   I mention three, though there are certainly others, all of which 
hinge on acknowledging that we are here discussing innovation-as-politics, which is likely to 
be essentially contested, especially in its digital disruptive form. 
 
First, while the ‘hardest’ cases of low-carbon transition, such as urban (and thence inter-
urban)3 mobility, are beginning to be addressed now, as mentioned above, they are still very 
far from being resolved. Indeed, we are still far off from a viable alternative socio-technical 
system even crystallizing in the collective imagination, let alone in manifest actuality.  Low-
carbon transitions, in other words, are not just matters of individually swapping our film 
cameras for smart phones, as in seminal case studies of disruptive innovation.  And this is not 
just because they require the parallel construction (and likely re-construction and continual 
upgrading) of infrastructures (Birch forthcoming), yielding thorny chicken-and-egg 
challenges or even ‘wicked’ problems.  In terms of power/knowledge relations, too, the 
redesign of cities and their mobility systems, as well as the upending of profoundly locked-in 
factors – from hugely empowered concentrations of corporate-state power (e.g. ‘carbon 
capital’ (Urry 2013)) down to daily micro-practices, habits, expectations and identities of 
automobility (Sheller 2013) –, promises to be several orders of greater difficulty to achieve. 
Witness, for example, the current travails of Uber (Bull 2017), supposed poster-boy for such 
Googliberal mobility-as-a-service ‘disruption’. 
 
Secondly, and similarly, it is hard to envisage how the ascent of China’s disruptive (low-
carbon) innovators as a political development, transforming incumbent systems of 
power/knowledge, will not be extremely turbulent, both globally and domestically.  As 
regards the latter, for instance, the continued growth and transformation of the political 
economy that the rise of these innovators will represent is also likely China’s best chance of 
escaping the ‘middle income trap’ (WB/DRC 2012), a key policy priority for the Chinese 
government.4 Yet there is no historical case to date of a country that has successfully vaulted 
this imposing hurdle without having also enacted considerable political and constitutional 
reform (Lewin et al. 2016) – reforms that seem increasingly (not diminishingly) unlikely in 
contemporary China at present (e.g. Shambaugh 2016).  How these increasing tensions play 
out, thus, in an authoritarian party-state is thus uncertain, at best.  In short, the most profound 
disruption of disruptive Chinese innovation(-as-politics) could yet prove to be (geo-)political.  
 
Finally, though, in terms of politics, it is crucial to note that this analysis may acknowledge 
and seek to harness the exceptional dynamism and current dominance of capitalist 
competitive agency, but it need not, and does not, glorify it. Rather, DLCI, and the innovation 
model and revitalized hegemonic regime of capitalism to which it may yet give rise, raises 
profound political and normative questions regarding who will gain and lose, and to what 
future, qualitatively and socioculturally, a DLCI-driven transition may lead us.  Moreover, as 
a process dominated by capitalism, the question is not whether but “which inequalities (old 
and new) this low-carbon transition could incubate?” And “what can be done about this?” 
Indeed, these are arguably the most important and urgent questions on which future research 
in transition studies should focus, especially since research democratically shaping disruptive 
innovation-as-politics presents a major strategic opportunity.  
 
In short, then, the foregoing argument offers essentially qualified conclusions.  It furnishes a 
hopeful message regarding DLCI’s potentially definitive role in low-carbon transitions that in 
2017 we cannot yet foresee and that could yet be pushed in significantly equitable directions.  
But it also augurs a turbulent, ‘illogical’, ‘non-linear’, profoundly contested and open-ended 
cultural-political-economic process, demanding persistent political engagement, with no 
realistic prospect of a tidy, rational and planned transition.  Yet what innovation model is best 
placed to work with, and prosper from, precisely such disruptive times?  Disruptive low-
carbon innovation, of course.  
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